Falkland Islands Museum and National Trust
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    • About Us
      • Policies and Objectives
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      • Our Services
      • The Lookout Gallery & EH
      • Meet the Staff
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      • Become a Member
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      • Founding Partners
    • Historic Dockyard Museum
    • Etched in Memory
    • National Trust
      • Our Mission
      • HER
      • The Dockyard
      • Cartmell Cottage
      • Hawk's Nest Shanty
      • Cape Pembroke Lighthouse
      • Whale Bone Arch
      • Corrals
      • Cemeteries
      • Bodie Creek Bridge
    • Past Finders
      • About Past Finders
      • Mt Harriett
      • Cape Pembroke Walk
      • Art Session
      • Craft session
      • Fire Station
      • 5th Anniversary
      • Gardening Cartmell Cottag
      • Historical walk
      • Christmas Crafts
      • Goose Green Farm
      • Murrell Farm
      • Horticultural Show
    • News & Events
      • Everything Changed
      • John R. Murray Donation
      • Talks
      • Museum at Night
      • Falkland's Ball
      • Macmillan Coffee Mornings
      • Community Day
      • Christmas Lights
    • Articles
      • Early History
      • 1982
      • WWI Battles
      • WWII
      • Battle of the River Plate
      • The Warrah
Falkland Islands Museum and National Trust
  • Home
  • About Us
    • Policies and Objectives
    • Trustees
    • Our Services
    • The Lookout Gallery & EH
    • Meet the Staff
    • Awards
    • Become a Member
    • FAQs
    • Founding Partners
  • Historic Dockyard Museum
  • Etched in Memory
  • National Trust
    • Our Mission
    • HER
    • The Dockyard
    • Cartmell Cottage
    • Hawk's Nest Shanty
    • Cape Pembroke Lighthouse
    • Whale Bone Arch
    • Corrals
    • Cemeteries
    • Bodie Creek Bridge
  • Past Finders
    • About Past Finders
    • Mt Harriett
    • Cape Pembroke Walk
    • Art Session
    • Craft session
    • Fire Station
    • 5th Anniversary
    • Gardening Cartmell Cottag
    • Historical walk
    • Christmas Crafts
    • Goose Green Farm
    • Murrell Farm
    • Horticultural Show
  • News & Events
    • Everything Changed
    • John R. Murray Donation
    • Talks
    • Museum at Night
    • Falkland's Ball
    • Macmillan Coffee Mornings
    • Community Day
    • Christmas Lights
  • Articles
    • Early History
    • 1982
    • WWI Battles
    • WWII
    • Battle of the River Plate
    • The Warrah

The Falkland's Conflict of 1982

At 8,000 miles from the United Kingdom and 4,000 miles from the nearest airbase at Ascension Island, only the Royal Navy could attempt to liberate the Falkland Islands  should Argentina invade. Such was the advice that the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, gave to the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret  Thatcher, in the House of Commons on 31 March 1982. He went on to tell her, robustly and against other military opinions, that should the Argentines invade, he believed that the islands could and should be liberated. Mrs Thatcher fortunately agreed as did the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin, when he returned from abroad. On 2 April, Argentina duly invaded the Falkland Islands. They also illegally occupied South Georgia. 

Within  five days of this meeting, a major naval carrier and amphibious group had sailed fully loaded from the UK aiming to join up with another naval group exercising off Gibraltar. A large fleet of Merchant Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships was rapidly gathered to support the Royal  Navy and the Landing Force. The latter was made up mainly from the Royal Navy’s 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines.  The brigade was soon  reinforced by two battalions of the Army’s Parachute Regiment, some Blues and Royals and extra Royal Artillery detachments. The RAF set about creating an important air-bridge to Ascension Island which became a vital half-way house for equipping, re-organising, training and planning.

The whole operation, code named Operation Corporate, was mounted by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse from the RN Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, Middlesex. He then commanded the Task Force. It was the first real conflict the Royal Navy had been called upon to fight since WWII and the first major British operation to use satellite communications to any extent.


South Georgia was indisputably British and a force under command of Captain Brian Young, Royal Navy, liberated it without loss of life. In doing so an Argentine submarine was badly damaged by a RN helicopter’s missile.

A naval blockade of the Falkland Islands  might have been successful in defeating the occupying troops, but with  winter approaching and the possibility that the Aircraft Carriers might  not be able to operate continuously, there was a risk that a blockade could be broken.  Furthermore, with an extended blockade, the Islanders  would probably suffer more than the enemy. It was, therefore, decided  to liberate the islands by mid-June using ground forces. To ensure  time for the troops to deploy, 3 Commando Brigade would have to be  landed by late-May. Hopefully, the Army’s 5 Brigade would be made  available in time to support them. To gain the intelligence needed for  planning the British attack, Special Forces needed to be inserted on  about 1 May. All, of course, was subject to the diplomatic situation.    The Government always hoped that the Argentines would withdraw peacefully.

Before the landings could be made in  reasonable safety, it was vital to achieve a degree of sea and air  supremacy in the landing area. 

Vice Admiral Peter Herbert, the  Flag Officer Submarines, quickly achieved surface and sub-surface  supremacy by deploying HMS Conqueror and four other nuclear powered  submarines.  With the Belgrano sunk, there was little further threat  from Argentine warships.


Achievement of air supremacy was less  simple since the Argentine airforces would not be easily drawn into  battle before the landings.   Nevertheless, Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward,  in command of the Carrier Battle Group, sailed ahead of the Amphibious Task Group. He made significant efforts to prevent their airforces  having free rein over the islands. At the same time, his ships and Sea Harriers harassed the occupying troops. Many new and unproven weapons  systems and equipment were employed and suitable tactics quickly  developed. Much ingenuity was used with, for instance, anti-submarine  helicopters acting as Exocet missile decoys. 

The Royal Air Force deployed Vulcan  bomber and Victor tanker aircraft to Ascension Island and initiated  raids against Stanley airfield.  While not very successful in bombing  terms, they were a spectacular success in terms of airmanship at long  range and brought home to the Argentines just how potentially vulnerable  were their own mainland targets.


The encouragingly successful  amphibious advance force operation on Pebble Island, using troops from  the Special Air Service, destroyed eleven aircraft.

Because of an  acute shortage of helicopters for a Landing Force of the size envisaged, the landings had to be by boat. Commodore Michael Clapp, in command of the Amphibious Task Group, and Brigadier Julian Thompson, commanding the Landing Force, chose San Carlos Water where there was  little risk of swell or surf. This was essential to allow the safe  loading of landing craft and mexeflote rafts from the Ro-Ro ships’ ramps  and then landing men and equipment onto the beaches by day and night. The water was deep enough for the largest ships while the land around offered suitable sites for a fuel farm, ammo and stores dumps, a field hospital and a harrier pad.  

Unfortunately, the necessity of using San  Carlos Water meant the landings had to be too far up-threat for  comfort. This gave the Argentine aircraft ample time on task but little  time for our Sea Harriers to remain overhead as Combat Air Patrol. Nevertheless, between them, the Sea Harriers and escorts severely  reduced the numbers of aircraft and the morale of the Argentine  aircrew. Speed in establishing the Landing Force ashore would, however, be vital.

Unfortunately, it also meant that the landing force  would have a long march to battle near Stanley over very difficult  terrain with little vehicular transport and far too few helicopters. 

The RN escorts were armed only for the  open waters of the Eastern Atlantic. Surrounded by land, they had too little warning of attack and their radars could not cope with the land echoes.  They were almost defenceless in such waters. Nevertheless, they maneuvered to take the brunt of the bombing. While protecting the  landings, three escorts were sunk and several were damaged together  with some RFA ships. Not one Merchant Navy ship was damaged and, very  fortunately, no RFA Landing Ship Logistic (LSL) was sunk. The logistic  position was so tight that the loss of only one LSL might have prevented  further military action.


Thanks in very large part to the  bravery of the RN’s Mine Clearance Divers who, although untrained for  the job, removed some eleven unexploded bombs from ships, not one item  of the Landing Force’s ammunition, fuel or other stores was lost to enemy action. 

Two RM helicopters and three aircrew were  lost during the assault. Remarkably, however, no other marine or  soldier was lost. Within six days, the whole Landing Force together  with almost all its equipment was safely ashore and ready to advance to  contact. The battle for Darwin and Goose Green began.


When Major  General Jeremy Moore and 5 Army Brigade landed, there was low cloud over San Carlos Water and little risk of air attack.  5 Bde consisted of  a Battalion each of the Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Ghurkha Rifles with additional Royal Artillery and Sapper support. 3 Cdo Bde had already established a forward base at Teal Inlet on the north coast which was being re-supplied by the LSLs. Again, all the men, ammunition, fuel and stores were landed safely but 5 Bde had arrived  without transport. When the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk three Chinook  heavy lift as well as eight Wessex support helicopters were lost. The  overland transport problem was dire but many islanders gave invaluable  help with tractors, trailers and local knowledge. 

Before assaulting the Argentine defenses around Stanley, Major General Moore decided to open a second southern  front close to the enemy lines. This required a forward base at  Fitzroy. A large amount of ammunition, fuel and stores, together with  many soldiers were taken forward by a long sea passage at night from San Carlos Water. 

On 8th June, when the sky cleared and air attacks  restarted, HMS Plymouth, the RFA LSLs Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad were damaged and the landing craft F4 was sunk. Unfortunately, some Welsh Guards and Sappers had remained onboard Sir Galahad but almost all the  equipment had been lifted ashore together with a Field Ambulance team, four Rapier missile units and much aviation fuel.  

Throughout the advance to Stanley, the  LSLs and RN support helicopters provided the main logistic support to  the land forces. A huge sea-lift reinforced the whole operation. 44  Royal Navy manned ships took part while over 65 civilian manned ships  were involved.   RN Minesweepers cleared areas so that the escorts could provide naval gunfire support at night, thus allowing the Royal Artillery to redeploy and re-supply their guns in darkness.


The  misfortune at Fitzroy necessitated a delay of two days. However, both  brigades were now well established with well-stocked forward bases and  the final land assault could begin. The Argentine garrison surrendered on 14 June but the possibility of hostilities continued at sea and in the air.


The cost of failed diplomacy had been considerable. In all, the British services lost 255 lives and many were wounded. 3 Islanders were sadly killed by gunfire.   

The maritime forces arguably had the  hardest fight. In all, about 170 men were killed at sea, of whom 85 were RN while 18 were MN. In addition, over 65 other servicemen were killed at sea or in naval helicopters. 4 escorts were sunk and 7 badly  damaged. A further 2 ships (1 RFA and 1 MN) were sunk and 4 damaged.

In the land battles, over 63 men lost their lives.


In  the air, the Royal Navy lost 6 Sea Harriers and 11 helicopters. The  RAF lost 4 Harrier GR3s while the Royal Marines lost 3 helicopters and  the Army one. With the Atlantic Conveyor, 3 Chinook and 8 Wessex  helicopters sank.


The Argentine lost over 60 aircraft and several ships as well as over 900 lives.


Protected by a strong garrison, the Falkland Islanders are now enjoying greater security and affluence under a government of their choice. Long may it last. 

Photos taken by Frank Allen - Frank is an '82 Veteran

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